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Abstract
Even under the direst necessity, Indian households do not seem to spend their budget in
a rational of survival: households from lower castes choose to consume less food and more
visible items than similar households from high castes, and this difference is stronger for
the poor. Using variations in upper caste wealth across regions, we show that disadvantaged
castes substitute visible consumption for food when upper castes are relatively richer. In
regions where Upper Castes are twice richer, low caste households spend up to 8% more
on visible and similarly less on food. For households under $2 dollars a day, it corresponds
to a daily budget reallocation of 15 dollar cents. We argue that consumption choices can
be partly explained by a preference for status, which depends on inequality between caste
groups. Importantly, preferences are upward-looking between castes: the high caste is
society’s reference group, and households outside of the caste system are not affected by it.
Our results are not driven by general equilibrium effects on prices and no similar effect is
observed on other expenditures. They underline the relevance of caste-targeted policies in
the process of development.
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1 Introduction
Compared to households from historically privileged groups, similar households from under-
privileged social groups spend a higher share of their budget on non-essential visible consump-
tion. Controlling for permanent income, Charles et al. (2009) ﬁnd that Blacks and Hispanics
in the US spend roughly 25% more on visible goods, and less on food, education and health.
Khamis et al. (2012) ﬁnd similar results for India. Another puzzle for consumption theory is
that even when undernourished, “the poor do see themselves as having a signiﬁcant amount of
choice, but they choose not to exercise that choice in the direction of spending more on food”.
Quite on the opposite, they allocate a substantial portion of their budget to visible items such as
tobacco or festivals (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007).
Several explanations have been discussed to explain these puzzles, among which the pref-
erence for status. We empirically explore the effect of status deprivation on consumption in the
context of the caste system in India. For Weber (1922), status groups result from a process of
social stratiﬁcation where individuals can be ranked in a hierarchy on the basis of non-economic
qualities: the ranking is maintained by birth and some easily identiﬁable conditions (name for
gentry and caste, phenotype for race, etc.). Ridgeway (2014) explores how status inequality
interacts and reinforces other types of inequality such as inequality of ressources or power:
holding a higher status rank generates prestige and access to privileges in return. We take a
similar approach by studying a speciﬁc interaction between status and economic inequality: the
way consumer behaviors are affected by the underlying status hierarchy. The individuals who
are deprived of status may wish to compensate by spending more on items consumed by higher
ranked individuals, an idea also developed by Veblen (1899). This behavior may prevent them,
in turn, to spend more on long-term investments such as food or education. In this article, we
test to what extent an increase in the relative wealth of the highest ranked group explains a
substitution effect of lower ranked groups between visible consumption and food.
We exploit the 66th round (2009-2010) of the Indian National Sample Surveys on Consump-
tion and Expenditure (NSS) in order to explore the empirical implications of status concern in
the consumption decisions of individuals across castes. We ﬁrst present several stylized facts on
the link between caste afﬁliation and economic status in contemporary India. We then replicate
the empirical approach adopted by Charles et al. (2009) and Khamis et al. (2012), who control
for permanent income, but ﬁnd slightly different results: low castes have a higher propensity
to spend on conspicuous items than similar high castes, but the gap is especially wide at low
income levels and disappears for high income levels. Controlling for local prices and other
supply factors, which is a novelty in our approach, does not qualitatively affect the results. Low
castes also spend signiﬁcantly less on food, education and other expenditures.
To explore the role of inequality between groups, we ﬁrst present cross-sectionnal correla-
tions which reveal that the regional expenditure share of low-castes households in visible goods
like toiletries (perfume, body cream, soap, etc.) is positively correlated to the relative total
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expenditure of high castes, while the consumption of high calorie products is negatively cor-
related with it. We then document the presence of a substitution effect between conspicuous
consumption and food due to the status externality that high castes inﬂict on lower castes. To
do so, we exploit the geographical variation in high castes’ level of total expenditures across
NSS Indian regions and explore its effect on low castes’ expenditures, controlling for other fac-
tors such as own caste group mean expenditure and local prices. We ﬁnd that the expenditures
on conspicuous consumption and food is respectively a positive and a negative function of the
mean expenditures of high castes.
Several robustness checks conﬁrm these ﬁndings: we do not observe any substitution effect
on other categories of expenditures, which further supports the argument that substitution takes
place between visible goods which have a high immediate status return, and expenditure on
food. Once controlling for high castes’ expenditure, we also do not observe any signiﬁcant
effect of own group’s expenditure on the conspicuous consumption of lower castes, contrary to
previous ﬁndings of Charles et al. (2009) and Khamis et al. (2012). We provide further evidence
that the substitution effect is indeed driven by upward-looking comparisons between castes due
to the presence of a caste hierarchy. We show that the relative consumption of the high castes
does not affect the consumption behavior of groups outside of the caste system such as Muslims
or Scheduled Tribes. We also ﬁnd that the effect is not a class effect as the regional variation in
top income concentration is not signiﬁcant.
Charles et al. (2009) also proposes to explain conspicuous consumption in the US by prefer-
ences for status. In particular, they show a negative relationship between the local mean income
of one’s race and one’s level of conspicuous consumption. They explain this relationship by
a signalling theory of conspicuous consumption where the individual has more incentive to
spend on visible consumption when her group is poorer, hence signalling more her wealth dif-
ference. There are two potential issues with this approach: the ﬁrst one is that it does not take
into account between-group inequality and hence sets one’s own social group as the reference
– we show, however, that inequality between social groups drives most of the effect. The sec-
ond is that in a signalling framework, the individual spends increasingly more of her budget
on conspicuous consumption while she gets richer (Heffetz, 2011), and it is therefore puzzling
to see the poorest people spending such a large share of their budget on what is qualiﬁed as
non-essential.
This article therefore sheds light on the empirics of status concerns using Indian data: is con-
spicuous consumption a mere signalling device or is it inﬂuenced by inequality? If inequality
is a driving factor, does it act through local supply or status preferences? Is the effect different
across the income distribution? What consumption items do people substitute when spending
more on conspicuous goods? Focusing on India is particularly interesting because of the low
inclusiveness of the growth process in the last decades, as well as the rise in income inequality
since the 1990s (Banerjee and Piketty, 2005). The rigid caste structure of the society can help
to identify the group of reference for status, and to explore the strength of status concern. India
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also remains a society characterized by very poor indicators in terms of poverty reduction and
nutrition: Deaton and Dre`ze (2009) highlight the striking fact that malnutrition is still prevalent
after the high growth rate of the past two decades, and calorie consumption has decreased for
all income classes.
Besides, systematic patterns in the consumption of underprivileged social groups may have
long-term welfare implications. First, between-group inequality can be thought as putting a
negative externality on consumption, which makes people spend more on certain goods that
what is socially optimal (Frank, 2005). Second, several instances in the literature underline
the difference between hunger and malnutrition. If the former leads to death, the latter can be
prevalent in the population with a signiﬁcant effect on individual future productivity (Dasgupta
and Ray, 1986). The long-term effects of malnutrition on physical work capacity includes
diminishing muscular strength, growth retardation, increased illness and vulnerability to disease
or decreased brain growth and development (Dasgupta, 1997). While people tend to think
of food as a pure necessity, an individual under malnutrition could have a certain amount of
choice on how to spend her budget without starving. It however could lead to unforeseen long-
term consequences such as the prevalence of malnutrition and poverty for those who choose to
favour short-term investments, under the form of conspicuous consumption, rather than long-
term investments such as food or education.
Ultimately, identifying the source of conspicuous consumption and the resulting distortions
in preferences is critical for policy implications. In a society where concern for status affects
the investment decisions of the most disadvantaged groups, redistribution alone may not modify
their persistent feeling of status deprivation, and may not be enough to dampen group inequali-
ties. Furthermore, the status externality being driven by the behavior of the high ranked group,
pro-poor growth policies may not alter signiﬁcantly the distortions in consumption choices,
contrary to policies focusing on transfers from the top group to the bottom ranked group. One
may thus be more inclined to address the concern itself by introducing policies targeting speciﬁc
groups.
The article is organized as follow: in Section 2, we provide a detailed literature review of the
different branches related to this article along with a brief review of the caste system. In Section
3, we present the database along with important stylized facts on conspicuous consumption and
inequality between caste groups in India. In Section 4 we ﬁrst show that different caste groups
make different consumption choices. We then test if caste inequality inﬂuences the patterns
of consumption of the lower castes, and confront it with alternative explanations. Section 5
concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Concern for Status and Conspicuous Consumption
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In his Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), Veblen explains that the concern for status is rooted
in the need to be esteemed, or honourable, in society. What governs social esteem is a set of
practices which are wasteful in nature and reinforce the status of individuals or social groups
performing them. These practices are referred to as conspicuous consumption and conspicuous
leisure. Being unable to perform these practices means becoming an outcast, a perspective
unpleasant enough so that Veblen qualiﬁes the practices as needs.
In most societies, we also observe status-based differences: social groups ordered according
to a status hierarchy maintained by birth and some easily identiﬁable conditions (name for
gentry and caste, phenotype for race, etc.) in order to restrain access to privileges (Weber,
1922). Social hierarchy can be reinforced by conspicuous consumption if low-status groups
feel the need to compensate their lack of historical status by spending more on wasteful items.
This phenomenon would indeed leave them with less budget for investing in non-visible goods
such as adequate nutrition, a guarantee of higher health and wealth in the future.
Heffetz and Frank (2008) provides a review on the preference for status in economics and
deﬁne status by two major ingredients. First, status is a positional good in the sense that the
satisfaction one gets from acquiring it depends on how it affects one’s relative rank in society.
This component underlines the signalling motive in conspicuous consumption. Second, status
is desirable, meaning agents should be ready to waste resources to improve it. In other words,
they should be ready to substitute between visible consumption and other less visible items such
as food or education. The second component tells us that the preference for status is not a mere
signalling device, but also a relative deprivation feeling which could be fed by others’ visible
consumption. The article focuses more on this particular aspect of status. To summarize, status
is either instrumental to the achievements of positive goals, or acts as a negative externality on
those who are deprived from it. Status preference likely possesses both components, and disen-
tangling them as well as testing them empirically is critical in order to understand consumption
choices.
Theoretical formalizations of Veblen (1899)’s idea of conspicuous consumption have been
made by Duesenberry (1949), Clark et al. (2008), Frank (2005), Frank et al. (2005), Kolm
(1995), Becker and Rayo (2006), Heffetz (2011), Ray and Robson (2012) or Bowles and Park
(2005). In these models, status seeking preferences affect choices households make, for ex-
ample by disincentivizing people to save (Becker and Rayo, 2006) or spending more time on
labour and less on leisure (Bowles and Park, 2005). The empirical evidence on the existence
of upward-looking effects is large. Easterlin (1995) ﬁrst provided evidence for social status
positioning in terms of income. More recent and notable contributions include Luttmer (2004),
Dynan and Ravina (2007) and Oishi et al. (2011). Carr and Jayadev (2014) or Bertrand and
Morse (2013) have identiﬁed relative income effects on consumption and debt based on sur-
vey data, and have underlined the role of inequality in these trickle-down effects. Previous
works have also shown evidence of reference-dependent preferences in India for conspicuous
consumption (Khamis et al. (2012), though using a different dataset), wedding expenditures
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(Bloch et al., 2004) or happiness (Fontaine and Yamada, 2013). The later example highlights
the interesting fact that between-caste comparisons reduce well-being more than within-caste
comparisons. This suggests that inter-group comparisons matter in the race for status.
Heffetz (2011) and Charles et al. (2009) contributed importantly to the empirical identiﬁca-
tion of the impact of status-seeking preference on consumption. The latter focus on American
racial groups and test the predictions of a signalling game to show that variations in the mean
income of one’s own racial group explain most of the variation in conspicuous consumption be-
tween races. Such models predict that individuals spend more on conspicuous items when their
group of reference is relatively poorer, as they have to distinguish themselves more from their
group of reference. Also, the poorest have no incentive to consume more conspicuously than
if there was no signalling motive. Our approach differs from the speciﬁcation of Charles et al.
(2009) in two respects: we allow for the effect of other groups on one’s conspicuous consump-
tion, and we integrate local prices in the empirical analysis. Our results favour the interpretation
of status as not a signal but an endogenous external habit (or relative deprivation).
2.2 Inequality and Malnutrition
This article is related to the literature on malnutrition and inequality, which relies on the pioneer-
ing work of Leibenstein (1957) on food intake, work capacity and unemployment. Dasgupta
and Ray (1986) develop a timeless theoretical framework to link involuntary unemployment to
the incidence of malnutrition, and relates them in turn to inequality in the distribution of assets.
They emphasise the importance of intertemporal substitution betwen past nutritional status and
present and future productivity. In the context of this article, the substitution between visible
consumption and adequate nutrition is intratemporal and may not fully take into account the
gains in future, or dynastic, productivity. This could constitute a source of intertemporal inef-
ﬁciency, and a perpetuating factor of inequality. Baland and Ray (1991) offer a demand-side
mechanism to the links between inequality and malnutrition through the competition between
luxuries and basic goods for the use of the same scarce resources. As inequality grows, the de-
mand for luxuries increases and the demand for basic goods is limited due to resources scarcity.
The demand-side mechanism presented in Baland and Ray (1991) highlights the potential effect
of inequality on prices and the economic environment, which may well explain malnutrition.
We address this concern in the paper as we introduce local price indexes in addition to supply
side controls in the empirical analysis.
On the relationship between income and adequate nutrition, even though the literature ac-
knowledges that the income elasticity of calories is not zero (as previously suggested by studies
such as Behrman and Deolalikar (1987a)), the estimated upper bound is between .3 and .5 (Sub-
ramanian and Deaton, 1996) and is not much higher for people living with less than $1 per day,
even when they report being under malnutrition (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007). Recent works
also suggest that other parameters than hunger have an important impact on food choices, even
when households are under malnutrition (Atkin, 2013a,b). This evidence suggests that even the
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extremely poor spend their budget while internalizing other constraints than maximizing nutri-
tion. Subramanian and Deaton (1996) report that the calories necessary for daily activity cost
less than 5 percent of the daily wage in rural India. Other estimates show similar results, making
it quite implausible that nutrition directly constraints income (Swamy (1997) for a review).
In the speciﬁc case of India, the relationship between income and calorie is even more of a
puzzle: the last decades witnessed a decrease in calorie intake along with non-increasing real
food expenditures, despite rapid economic growth. The Indian calorie consumption decline
has been explained as a consequence of the improved epidemiological environment and the
reduction of physical activity (Deaton and Dre`ze, 2009), or the increase in non-food essential
expenditures such as education and health as well as a decline in home-grown food production
(Basu and Basole, 2012). These mechanical explanations do not fully account for the prevalence
of malnutrition in India1, especially given the amount of choice that the individuals face in their
budget allocation.
We contribute to this literature by establishing the link between lower spendings on food
and inequality through a demand-driven channel. We explain the heterogeneity of nutritional
choice by the allocation bias induced by inequality: low status groups substitute more conspic-
uous consumption to food in places where the high status (reference) group is comparatively
wealthier. The choice of spending on conspicuous consumption instead of adequate nutrition
represents an intra-temporal choice between high current status versus high future returns. This
mechanism takes into account the fact that nutrition determines long-term outcomes, but also
that individuals do not maximize their nutrition at all levels of income: we can simultaneously
observe individuals under malnutrition and spending a substantial amount of their income on
non-essential items, two facts that the aforementioned literature underlines. The status exter-
nality may contribute, in return, to the perpetuation of inequality, as preferences biased towards
current status undermine future outcomes.
2.3 Caste system and Status Hierarchy
The Indian caste system has been widely studied and debated between different competing the-
ories about its formation, rigidity and historical evolution. We do not enter into the complexity
of the concept of caste in this article, but rather would use broad deﬁnitions enabling us to
highlight interesting trends produced by such a society in terms of status and economic choices.
Caste is an English term referring to two divisions: varna and jati. The jati is in fact the
operative category which deﬁnes codes and social relationships within the Indian society. There
exist over 3,000 Jatis. Jatis are localized, hereditary, endogamous and characterized by the
1The last thirty years have seen a reduction of around ﬁfty percent in the prevalence of severe undernutrition,
as well as a sharp decline in the prevalence of clinical signs of nutritional deﬁciency. Despite this improvement,
the overall levels of undernutrition in India are still very high. Close to half of all Indian children are underweight
(some of them even in better-off households), and about half suffer from anemia. Also, thirty-six percent of adult
women suffer from low Body Mass Index (below 18.5). The anthropometric indicators have improved at a very
slow pace compared to other countries (Deaton and Dre`ze, 2009).
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status acquired through their occupation as well as through a speciﬁc set of codes and customs
(food, rituals, etc.). The rules of conduct are linked to a speciﬁc degree of purity or prestige
vis-a`-vis the members of the other jatis with which one lives or meets (Jaffrelot, 2014). The
family name of an individual, in many cases, may specify the jati to which he belongs. It
is to be noted that even in urban India, arranged wedding – preserving endogamy – is much
more the norm than the exception (Deshpande, 2011). Jatis roughly align themselves with the
scale of status determined by the varnas2. Varna is often translated from Sanskrit as colour,
though this word could be misleading as the concept of caste is well distinguished from the
one of race. The word appeared as early as in the Rigveda (hymn XC, on Purusha). The
society is divided by occupations between Brahmin (priests and teachers), Kshatriya (warriors
and royalty), Vaisya (traders, merchants, moneylenders) and Shudra (engaged in menial, lowly
jobs). A ﬁfth category, the Atishudra – so called Untouchables –, is considered as part of the
varna system by being excluded from it.
In Post-independence India, Caste- and religious-based discriminative behavior is formally
forbidden and Untouchability abolished (Articles 15 and 17 of the Indian Constitution, 1950).
Various measures of positive action have been implemented since then, especially targeting the
Dalits (name that the Atishudra have given to themselves, meaning “oppressed”) and the tribal
communities of India (Adivasis). Quota policies reserve seats in the State legislative assemblies
and the Parliament, as well as in the public sector and all public education establishments. The
corresponding administrative categories, which we will use in this article, are Scheduled Castes
(SC) for Dalits and Scheduled Tribes (ST) for Adivasis. To simplify notations, we will refer to
high caste for the Brahmin and Other upper castes, middle caste for the Other Backward Classes
and low caste for the Scheduled Castes.
The lower castes in the Indian hierarchy, and especially the Dalits, have a long history of
persecution and prevention of access to public space and public resources. Regarding the Dalits,
Ambedkar reports in a manuscript entitled Untouchables or The Children of India’s Ghetto that
it is an offence to acquire wealth such as land and cattle, to build a house with tiled roof, to put
on a clean dress, wear shoes, put on a watch or gold ornaments, to give high sounding names
to their children, to speak a cultured language. These customs and characteristics are closely
related to the implicit status hierarchy: a Dalit is supposed to conform to the status of an inferior,
and must wear visible marks of his inferiority for the public to know and identify him.
This hierarchy of status causes a mimicry of customs and practices in a cascade from the
locally dominant caste to the lowest ranking one in a chain reaction. Srinivas (1956) formed
the concept of Sanskritization as the process through which a low caste could potentially, in a
generation or two, rise to a higher position in the hierarchy by adopting the customs, rites, and
beliefs of the Brahmins, and the adoption of the Brahminic way of life. Srinivas underlines,
however, that the process of imitation is observed even among untouchables, who have no hope
2However, the hierarchy and rules of conduct followed by the jatis are much more complex and do not match
perfectly the rank determined by the varna system (Deshpande, 2011).
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in seeing their status increase (movements across castes occur in the middle regions of the
hierarchy). It therefore seems that despite very low caste mobility, the aspiration to visibly
appear of a higher status is widespread in the society. He writes: “The entire way of life of the
top castes seeps down the hierarchy. And the language, cooking, clothing, jewelry, and way of
life of the Brahmans spreads eventually to the entire society.”
These observations are consistent with the view that status concern could be thought of as
an externality imposing a feeling of relative deprivation to the disadvantaged, and not simply
instrumental.
3 Database and Stylized Facts
3.1 Database
The database we use is the National Sample Survey on Consumption and Expenditure, collect-
ing socio-economic data and consumer expenditures. These surveys are cross-sections and do
not contain information on income, though the information on total and speciﬁc expenditures
is very detailed. They also provide detailed economic, demographic and social characteristics
for households and individuals. They are representative at the regional level, which is formed
of several districts and smaller than a State (88 regions for 29 States and 7 union territories).
Regions have been constructed so as to gather territories sharing similar agro-climatic and pop-
ulation characteristics within each State. We present results from the 66th thick round (2009-
2010) in the analysis of consumption patterns across social groups. Subsequent works will use
ﬁve thick rounds (three decades) of the NSS surveys.
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3.2 Deﬁnition of expenditure groups
The issue we face with the deﬁnition of expenditures is to determine what is conspicuous.
Heffetz (2011) largely contributed to the recent advances in the deﬁnition of conspicuous con-
sumption and its empirical implications. He shows that conspicuous goods are also more visible
goods which correspond to goods with a high income elasticity. His visibility measure predicts
up to one-third of the observed variation in income elasticities across consumption categories in
U.S. data. Following the type of survey that Heffetz introduced, Charles et al. (2009) conducted
a survey of 320 American students, and determined a set of visible items: expenditures on ap-
parel (including accessories), personal care and vehicles. They exclude expenditure on housing
given a potential differential treatment on the housing market depending on race. We choose to
do the same in our analysis, as housing segregation is also documented in India across castes
and religions (Jaffrelot, 2014). Khamis et al. (2012) follows the same approach than Charles
et al. (2009) by conducting a survey on 163 Indian students in Economics, and take on a higher
number of items as visible: personal goods, transport equipment, footwear, vacations, furni-
ture and ﬁxtures, social functions, repair and maintenance, house rent and rent, entertainment,
clothing and bedding, jewelry and ornaments and recreation goods. Their list contains items
disposed within houses or consumed during social occasions, which could be the sign that In-
dian society has stronger social ties across neighbourhoods. We reproduce their table in table
10 (appendix).
The expenditure we refer to as visible adds to the visible expenditures list of Charles et al.
(2009) the items considered by Khamis et al. (2012), which are more visible in repeated inter-
actions among neighbours such as house furnitures. Our approach considers conspicuousness
under the insights of Veblen, with the central idea of wastefulness of consumption. Focusing
on visible personal components could limit the phenomenon to relatively mobile areas. In the
rural Indian context with very low mobility and strong social ties, it is very likely that visible
consumption could be extended to household possessions.
Our measure of visible (or conspicuous) consumption in the empirical analysis includes
clothing, footwear, bedding, conveyance expenses, transport equipment, personal goods, toi-
letries, beauty and tailoring services, furniture and ﬁxtures. We exclude jewellery as in the case
of India, jewels are mostly used as an asset and a source of savings3.
Our measure of food consumption contains all categories of aliments, from meat, ﬁsh and
eggs to vegetables or cereals. We construct other aggregates of expenditures which will be used
a placebo tests: education and health, services and other less visible goods.
3.3 Group inequality in India
The caste system attempts to distribute tasks to each individual in society not on the basis of
their aptitudes but of the social status of their parents. It has been argued that with development
3Note that our results are robust to the inclusion of jewels
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and liberalization of Indian, caste does not determine occupations and social position anymore.
However, Deshpande (2011) shows that the Upper Castes (high caste in our own terminology)
still hold over prestigious, better-paying occupations and that the change in the occupational
structure brought by economic growth continues to show a substantial discrimination on the
basis of hereditary status. If the upper castes have maintained a high wealth level and high
connectivity to the Indian elite, it is not so surprising that economic growth and openness do
not change drastically the structure of the Indian society.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of NSS 66th Round Household Expenditure
Scheduled Castes OBCs Hindu Upper Castes Muslims
mean mean mean mean
Head Age 44.70 46.49 47.86 45.41
Head Literate 0.63 0.75 0.88 0.67
Head Higher Education 0.07 0.11 0.24 0.07
Household size 4.63 4.56 4.36 5.29
Rural households 0.66 0.61 0.46 0.52
Monthly Per Capita Expenditure 1124.12 1359.43 2023.03 1282.33
Land owned (ha) 0.31 0.69 0.71 0.31
Observations 16225 32894 23679 12445
Table 1 gives a few descriptive statistics about economic outcomes by main caste and reli-
gious groups (Hindu Upper Castes, OBC, SC, and Muslims). The striking fact is that the levels
of education and wealth seem to follow the underlying caste structure : the head of the house-
hold has a higher education diploma for 24% of high caste households, while only 11% of the
middle caste and 7% of the low caste and Muslim achieve such a level. The monthly per capita
expenditure of an average upper caste household is 1.5 times the one of an average middle caste
household and 1.8 times of a low caste household. High caste households are also notably more
urbanized, a fact which could explain part of the difference in annual incomes. The total land
owned follows a similar trend hierarchy.
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Figures 1 and 2 draw the kernel density for monthly per capita expenditure and land own-
ership across social groups. Here again, the economic status varies across social groups: upper
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caste households are less numerous in the poorer sections of society, and their consumption and
land densities have much thicker tails on the right than for other social groups. We notice, as
Deshpande (2011), that even a broad decomposition in varna and religious afﬁliations in India
provides evidence that the link between social group and economic status is not broken in con-
temporary India. More than 90% of the regions in our sample are dominated by high caste when
it comes to average per capita expenditures.
(a) Relative Consumption of high castes
Households
(b) Relative Consumption of low castes
Households
Figure 3: Residual Variation in group MPCE across Indian Regions Controlling for Regional
MPCE, NSS 66
However, there are important variations across region in the importance of this dominance.
Figure 3 maps the residual variation in high caste and low caste mean per capita expenditure
(or relative consumption), after controlling for general variation in regional mean expenditure.
Importantly, regions where the mean expenditure of high caste is higher seem to be regions
where the mean expenditure of low caste is lower, which is why it is critical to control for the
mean regional per capita expenditure of own caste group in the empirical analysis. We use these
variations in the empirical analysis to infer how local economic inequality affects consumption
choices of disadvantaged groups within a structural status hierarchy.
3.4 Regional expenditure shares and group inequality
Looking at the correlation between regional relative consumption of the high castes and con-
sumption share of the low castes for different categories, we ﬁnd interesting patterns. Control-
ling for average regional consumption, Figure 4 shows that the relative consumption of the high
caste is negatively correlated with necessary goods such as calorie intensive animal products
(meat, ﬁsh, dairy or eggs), but positively correlated with the consumption of more luxurious
and visible goods such as perfume or beauty cream.
This could simply be a systemic effect affecting all households similarly. Indeed, a higher
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relative consumption of high caste households could be correlated to higher levels of adver-
tisement, higher urbanization rates or standard supply side channels such as relative prices of
toiletries. However, Figure 5 (appendix) shows that even in the absence of controls, we do not
ﬁnd such correlations between the relative consumption of the high castes in a given region and
their own consumption share of such products. This simple stylized fact shows a potential effect
of between-group inequality on consumption patterns.
(a) Toileteries (perfume, soap or body cream) (b) Animal Products (meat, ﬁsh, eggs or dairy)
Figure 4: LC regional expenditures shares vs. HC regional income (mean regional income
control)
Interestingly, it seems to be speciﬁc to the caste hierarchy. Indeed, if we look at social
groups which are outside of the Hindu caste system such as Muslims, we ﬁnd no correlation on
toiletries items and a much lower effect on calorie-intensive food expenditures (Figure 6 in the
Appendix). This is striking considering the fact that Muslims are similarly segregated than the
low-caste in India and have fairly equivalent economic characteristics. The empirical analysis
investigates whether caste hierarchy does play a role in explaining such ﬁndings.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Different consumption choices across caste groups
We ﬁrst assess whether lower caste households consume more conspicuous items and less food
compared to households from higher castes. From Heffetz (2011), we identify conspicuous
goods as those which have the highest visibility. Our results are robust to variations in our mea-
sure of visible consumption, in particular whether or not we weight each category of visible
items according to its visibility index from survey data. The ﬁrst equation is meant to compare
households who are different only in their caste group, but have similar demographic and eco-
nomic characteristics. Following Charles et al. (2009), we use a log-log model of demand and
estimate:
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ln(Xih) = β0+γiln(Eh)+
∑
k
αi,kcasteh,k+
∑
k
βi,kcasteh,kln(Eh)+
∑
j
γj ln(pricejh)+δHh+ih
(1)
where ln(Xih,kl) is the logarithm of the expenditure on item i spent by household h belong-
ing to social group k; ln(Eh) is the household’s total expenditure, castek,h are dummy variables
denoting whether a household belongs to middle caste, low caste or other social groups (the
default being high caste); ln(pricejh) is the price of the jth item; Hh is a vector of household
attributes and geographical controls that we describe below.
The αk parameters correspond to the taste (intercept) of each social group k for item i.
In other words, it captures how much more (or less) of expenditure Xih other castes consume
compared to similar high caste households. We expect these parameters to be positive on visible
consumption and negative on food for Low and middle castes. while the betak parameters
capture the difference in income elasticity compared to the high caste households. The latter
set of parameters is a novelty of our approach, aimed at capturing differences across castes
in the relative deprivation and signalling components of consumption. If we think of relative
deprivation as setting a social subsistence level, we expect poor households to be more affected
by the caste hierarchy than rich ones, i.e. the difference in consumption choices between a poor
low caste and a poor high caste is larger than the difference in consumption choices for the rich
households. If this hypothesis holds, the relative deprivation hypothesis (status externality) is
more likely than the signalling one.
We do not observe income in the NSS databases, but total expenditure usually provides a
good proxy for permanent income under the assumption of consumption-smoothing behaviour.
This is the standard method in developing countries where data on income either do not exist or
are extremely biased. However, there are two classical problems with this measure of perma-
nent income: ﬁrst, there is a simultaneity issue as both components of expenditures are jointly
determined in decisions over the life cycle, which usually creates an upward bias (Subramanian
and Deaton, 1996), and second, measurement errors in sub-categories of expenditures and total
expenditure are likely to be correlated, which leads to an errors-in-variables problem with a
usual downward bias (Hausman, 2001). Due to these biases, there is a long tradition in using
permanent income instrumental variables for the estimation of Engel curves (Liviatan, 1961)
and more generally in cross-sectionnal analysis (Mayer, 1972). Section 6.1 in the Appendix
discusses further the literature on this issue and describes the IV speciﬁcation. The later re-
inforces our results but no instrument can fully respect the exclusion restriction in this case4.
Therefore, we keep the OLS speciﬁcation as our main speciﬁcation in the article.
Table 2 shows the gap in visible and food expenditures captured by the OLS speciﬁcation
with and without household and supply controls. Since visible expenditure is likely to have
4In a future version of the paper, it could be possible to estimate income matching NSS data with IHDS income
data as a robustness check.
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an income elasticity above unity and food expenditure below unity, it is crucial to control for
characteristics that make households similar on every dimension but the social group one. Oth-
erwise, high caste households should mechanically spend a higher share of their income on
visible goods and a lower share on food compared to lower castes, simply because they are
richer or have different characteristics. In addition to total expenditure in columns 1 and 4 (for
visible and food expenditure respectively), we introduce household attributes Hh used by Sub-
ramanian and Deaton (1996) in columns 2 and 5: log of hh size, fraction of people by age and
gender, household type, education and occupation head. We also add a ﬁxed effect for each
of the four sub-rounds of the survey, which controls for seasonal variations and measurement
errors as households are interviewed in different months during the year.
Lastly, there may be local price variations related to between-caste inequality, either through
general equilibrium effects (Baland and Ray, 1991), or due to price discriminations. We intro-
duce prices in the demand speciﬁcation, but do not use the price that the household paid because
of endogeneity issues. We thus follow Atkin (2013b) and compute at the village level a median
price index for nine subcategories of expenditures (cereals, animal products, fruits and vegeta-
bles, oils and spices, processed food, visible goods, durables, services, other goods). Columns
3 and 6 introduce the logarithm of the median village price for each category. As expected,
introducing the price lowers down the caste-speciﬁc coefﬁcients, but they remain qualitatively
equivalent.
We may face other problems of endogeneity, for example in the case where individuals or
jatis who enjoy relatively more consuming conspicuously, or have a preference for these items,
self-select into particular locations. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) show that spatial mobility
is extremely low in rural India due to the efﬁciency of jati-based networks to insure individuals
against temporary income shocks and smooth consumption over time. Assuming zero mobility
is therefore a common assumption for empirical works on India.
Another issue could arise from the federal structure of India, each Indian State implementing
regulations in speciﬁc domains. Also, there is a wide difference of access to coastal regions,
fertility and irrigation or weather endowments across India. We therefore add ﬁxed effects for
Indian states or NSS agro-climatic regions (a sub unit of States) in our speciﬁcation. Within
each State or region, districts and villages may not have access to a similar set of goods, or the
same varieties of a good. This is likely to be a function of population density and urbanization,
so we also add these two controls at the district level to capture localized supply effects, along
with whether the household lives in and urban or rural area.
Without controls, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference in visible consumption between
low and high caste households. As soon as we add household and spatial controls, the sign
on αi,k becomes positive for visible consumption and remains negative for food. The interac-
tion between the caste dummy and total consumption is of opposite sign, which means that the
difference between low and high caste households is stronger for the poor than for the rich.
Besides, the coefﬁcients are also stronger and more signiﬁcant for the low caste households
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Table 2: Visible and food expenditures gap between low caste and and high caste households,
NSS 66
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
visible visible visible food food food
log total expenditure 1.029∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0318) (0.00974) (0.00885) (0.0177)
Low Castes 0.191 0.299∗∗ 0.272∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗ -0.762∗∗∗ -0.731∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.136) (0.133) (0.108) (0.0811) (0.0757)
Middle Castes 0.153 0.230∗ 0.208∗ -0.708∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.126) (0.123) (0.111) (0.0770) (0.0714)
Muslims -0.465∗∗∗ 0.0329 0.0194 -0.732∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.167) (0.162) (0.108) (0.0856) (0.0801)
Low Castes x log total expenditure -0.0221 -0.0364∗∗ -0.0337∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.0889∗∗∗ 0.0854∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0131) (0.00967) (0.00903)
Middle Castes x log total expenditure -0.0164 -0.0284∗ -0.0254∗ 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0471∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0134) (0.00910) (0.00842)
Muslims x log total expenditure 0.0527∗∗∗ -0.00523 -0.00211 0.0988∗∗∗ 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0129) (0.0101) (0.00949)
Observations 100831 91862 90482 100824 91862 90482
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.752 0.771 0.828 0.877 0.885
Household Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Supply Side Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Notes. The table reports the OLS estimations of equation (1) on our measure of visible consumption and food expenditures. The
regression is performed on the entire sample. It reports the gap in expenditures of LC, MC and Muslim households compared to
HC households. Visible and food consumption are regressed on the log of total expenditure of each household, interacted with
a caste dummy. Speciﬁcations (1) and (4) only controls for household total expenditure. Speciﬁcations (2) and (5) adds state
ﬁxed effects, household controls (log of hh size, fraction of people by age and gender, household type, education and occupation
head) and ﬁxed effect for each of the four sub-rounds. Speciﬁcation (3) and (6) also includes supply side controls (mean regional
consumption, population and urbanization at district levels, sector, local price indexes). Sampling weights are included. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the village level) are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
compared to the middle caste households. These results indicates that poor households belong-
ing to social groups which are placed lower in the status hierarchy increase their level of visible
consumption and consume relatively less in food. The fact that the Veblen effect weights more
heavily on the poorest households suggests that the externality is a combination of structural
status hierarchies between group and conjectural status given a certain level of income.
Interestingly, if we look at the visible and food expenditure gap of Muslims compared to
high caste households, there is no signiﬁcant effect for visible consumption and the effect on
food is much smaller, even after including controls. Muslims households are good candidates
for a placebo check on the relevance of caste hierarchy. Indeed, similarly to low caste house-
holds (scheduled castes), Muslims have been historically discriminated. They are also close to
lower castes in terms of economic characteristics. The fact that we do not observe any differ-
ence in choices for visible consumption and a smaller effect on food supports the hypothesis
that groups outside of the caste hierarchy are not affected by it.
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4.2 Testing the Veblen Hypothesis
Veblen (1899)’s theory of leisure and consumption argues that individuals try to reach an ac-
ceptable level of decency given speciﬁc visible attributes in order to be esteemed by their peers
and within society as a whole. This decency level is endogenous: it is determined by the con-
sumption habits of the highest social and pecuniary class, deﬁned by Veblen as the Leisure
Class. This approach differs from the classical one which considers conspicuous consumption
as a mere signal for status and wealth. In Veblen’s theory, individuals belonging to lower castes
or classes would consume more conspicuously to make up for the lower relative status attributed
to them. The higher is the gap separating one’s own group from the leisure class, the higher the
effect should be.
To identify the persistent effect of group inequality on consumption choices, we follow a
similar approach than Charles et al. (2009) and exploit regional variations in social groups’
economic status, evidenced in Figure 3. As in Section 4.1, we take the average monthly expen-
diture per capita of a group in each region as a proxy for its mean income. Besides, consumption
captures the visible part of income, which is typically what matters for between-group compar-
isons. Contrary to previous studies in the literature on the Veblen effect, we test whether caste
hierarchy matters and if group comparison is upward-looking.
We focus on three major Indian caste groups: high caste (Brahmin and Other Upper Castes),
middle caste (Other Backward Classes) and low caste (Scheduled Caste), that can be ranked
from higher structural status to lower structural status. We perform the empirical analysis on
the two disadvantaged social groups which inherit a low level of structural status, the middle
caste (MC) and the low caste (LC). We test whether variations in the local level of high caste’s
economic status can explain the gap in visible consumption and food expenditure of the lower
caste households. The lower geographical unit for a representative sample of households in our
data is the agro-climatic region, so we compute the average regional consumption level of each
caste group for the 87 Indian agro-climatic regions. Unless one controls for the average income
of the household’s own group (signalling theory) and for the general variation in regional in-
come, the coefﬁcient is biased. Indeed, high caste’s economic status could otherwise capture a
higher regional wealth or the gap with the low caste’s economic status. This distinguishes our
strategy from Charles et al. (2009) and Khamis et al. (2012). We use the following speciﬁcation:
ln(Xih) = β0 + γiln(Eh) + βHC ln(EHC,r) + βownln(Eown,r) +
∑
j
γj ln(pricejh) + δHh + ih (2)
The coefﬁcient γi captures how the expenditure on item i (typically visible consumption
or food) varies with the total expenditure of the household h. The βown is what Charles et al.
(2009) and Khamis et al. (2012) identify based on an approach of status as signalling. They test a
signalling theory in which only one’s own group matters and do not address the issue of between
group inequality. To assess whether our model is better at understanding patterns of conspicuous
consumption than a signalling model, we add the regional mean per capita expenditures of the
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high caste households, captured by the coefﬁcient βHC . This allows us to discriminate between
the signalling and the relative deprivation approach. In the relative deprivation hypothesis, a
higher economic status of the high caste would bias low castes’ expenditure towards visible
consumption, we therefore expect βHC to be positive for visible expenditure and negative for
food. If the signalling hypothesis does not hold once we control for regional and high caste
economic status, βown should be insigniﬁcant.
We use the same vector Xi of household controls as in Equation (1). We add state ﬁxed
effects to control for institutional differences between states and a vector of regional controls
which includes the regional fraction of total Indian population, the regional fraction of urban
households and the mean expenditure level in each region to make sure βHC and βown do not
capture any regional trend.
Table 3 shows the results on conspicuous consumption and food expenditures. The tables
include the results with local price indexes (columns (2) and (4) of Table 3). The inclusion of
prices distinguishes our work from the previous empirical studies on conspicuous consumption
which do not directly control for the inﬂuence of inequality on prices. In particular, following
Baland and Ray (1991), this effect is likely to produce an upward bias on visible expenditures
and a downward bias on food expenditure as a higher level of inequality is predicted to reduce
the relative price of luxury goods compared to necessities.
The results of Table 3 are in favour of a relative deprivation theory of consumption rather
than a signalling one. The coefﬁcient βuc is positive and highly signiﬁcant for visible expen-
diture. There is also evidence of a substitution effect with food, with a negative and highly
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on βuc. The average economic status of one’s own caste is either positive
or not signiﬁcant, contrary to Charles et al. (2009) and Khamis et al. (2012).
The results are robust to other explanations such as the effect of inequality on prices, or
the insurance effect of jati-based networks (Mazzocco and Saini, 2012)). The effect is stronger
on low castes households than on middle caste households, in line with the Veblen hypothesis
on the importance of hierarchy and upward-looking comparison effects between castes. As
expected, the addition of local price indexes reduces the signiﬁcance and magnitude of the
effect of inequality, but it remains signiﬁcant. This supports the view that unless one controls
for prices, the positive impact of group inequality on consumption choices is upwardly biased.
The absence of a signiﬁcant positive effect on visible or food expenditures deters the possibility
of a positive correlation between household consumption and the one of its own caste due to a
group-based insurance network at the regional level.
The ﬁrst stage regression in Section 1 showed that choices are especially biased for the lower
income households within a low caste. In table 4, we test whether the Veblen effect of between-
group inequality is stronger for below median households belonging to low and middle caste.
It appears that the effect on visible consumption is concentrated on below median households
who are fairly poor and under malnutrition. This result is an additional source of concern that
the feeling of relative deprivation could hurt the destitute the most.
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Table 3: Effect of between-group inequality on visible and food expenditure by middle castes
and low castes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lvisible lvisible lfood lfood
log total expenditure 1.130∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗
(0.0959) (0.0833) (0.0456) (0.0399)
log mean expenditure HC 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0651∗ -0.0884∗∗∗ -0.0782∗∗∗
(0.0370) (0.0347) (0.0186) (0.0178)
log mean expenditure HC x MC dummy -0.0552∗∗ -0.0441∗∗ -0.0135 -0.0102
(0.0229) (0.0216) (0.0113) (0.0110)
LC dummy -0.395∗∗ -0.315∗∗ -0.120 -0.0932
(0.170) (0.161) (0.0839) (0.0818)
log mean expenditure own caste 0.0642 0.109∗∗ -0.0327 -0.0288
(0.0592) (0.0489) (0.0268) (0.0227)
log regional expenditure -0.243∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.0506) (0.0492) (0.0277) (0.0272)
Observations 43879 43879 43878 43878
Adjusted R2 0.713 0.740 0.870 0.874
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spatial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Price Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes. The table reports estimations of equation (2) on our measure of visible consumption and food expen-
ditures. The regression is performed on the subsample of Middle Caste (MC) and Low Caste (LC). Visible
and food consumption are regressed on the log of mean regional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE)
of the corresponding High Caste (interacted with a caste dummy for MC) and on the log of mean regional
monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of household’s own caste. In addition to state ﬁxed effects, we
control for the economic level of the NSS region by introducing the log of mean MPCE in each regression.
All regressions include household controls (log of hh size, fraction of people by age and gender, household
type, education and occupation head. We also add a ﬁxed effect for each of the four sub-rounds) and spatial
controls (population and urbanization at district levels, sector). Local price indexes are added in speciﬁca-
tion (2) and (4). Sampling weights are included. Robust standard errors (clustered at the village level) are
reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Lastly, the effect on conspicuous consumption is robust to the measure of visible goods that
we use. Table 5 shows that the effect is stronger on the most visible items, typically clothing
and footwear or residential goods reported as highly visible in the Indian context by Khamis
et al. (2012). The decomposition of food expenditure also reveals that households seem to
substitute within food items. They spend less on protein-intensive products such as meat and
dairy products (which are more expensive) and more on calorie-intensive items such as cereals,
which are also cheaper.
To check whether between-caste inequality explains the difference in consumption choices
from Section 4.1, we add the interaction between caste dummies from speciﬁcation (1) and
the mean regional consumption of high caste households. The speciﬁcation allows us to use
regional ﬁxed effects in order to control any other structural component of consumption choices
apart from differences in between-caste inequality. Table 6 shows that the choice difference
disappears for visible consumption and is reduced for food expenditures. On the contrary, the
coefﬁcients on Muslims do not vary signiﬁcantly compared to Table 2.
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Table 4: Decomposition of Veblen effect on below median vs. above median households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lvisible lvisible lfood lfood
log total expenditure 1.307∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.131) (0.0788) (0.0629)
log mean expenditure HC 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0751∗∗ -0.0964∗∗∗ -0.0808∗∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0316) (0.0174) (0.0165)
log mean expenditure HC x Above median -0.119∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.000967 -0.00648
(0.0246) (0.0215) (0.0124) (0.0115)
LC dummy 0.0443∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0143) (0.00735) (0.00714)
log mean expenditure own caste 0.0458 0.0919∗∗ -0.0388 -0.0338
(0.0580) (0.0466) (0.0260) (0.0217)
log regional expenditure -0.209∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0496) (0.0476) (0.0268) (0.0265)
Observations 43879 43879 43878 43878
Adjusted R2 0.702 0.739 0.871 0.875
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Price Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes. The table reports estimations of equation (2) on our measure of visible consumption and food expenditures.
The regression is performed on the subsample of Middle Caste (MC) and Low Caste (LC). Visible and food con-
sumption are regressed on the log of mean regional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of the corresponding
High Caste (interacted with a dummy for below median households) and on the log of mean regional monthly per
capita expenditure (MPCE) of household’s own caste. In addition to state ﬁxed effects, we control for the eco-
nomic level of the NSS region by introducing the log of mean MPCE in each regression. All regressions include
household controls (caste, log of hh size, fraction of people by age and gender, household type, education and
occupation head. We also add a ﬁxed effect for each of the four sub-rounds) and spatial controls (population and
urbanization at district levels, sector). Local price indexes are added in speciﬁcation (2) and (4). Sampling weights
are included. Robust standard errors (clustered at the village level) are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The Veblen analysis is therefore supported by empirical evidence. There may be alterna-
tive hypotheses with similar explanatory power such as the misidentiﬁcation of the group of
reference. In the following section, we run a series of placebo checks to test for alternative
explanations that would invalidate our results.
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Table 5: Decomposition of Veblen effect on subcategories of visible and food expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lclothing lclothing lresidential lresidential lanimal lanimal lcereal lcereal
log total expenditure 0.849∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 2.838∗∗∗ 2.214∗∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗ 1.793∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.102) (0.399) (0.334) (0.162) (0.141) (0.110) (0.0940)
log mean expenditure HC 0.161∗∗∗ 0.0853∗ 0.433∗∗ 0.375∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ 0.0226 0.0465
(0.0470) (0.0443) (0.185) (0.148) (0.0668) (0.0639) (0.0457) (0.0433)
log mean expenditure HC x MC dummy -0.0409 -0.0292 0.239∗ 0.145 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ 0.0416 0.0428∗
(0.0280) (0.0269) (0.126) (0.105) (0.0420) (0.0405) (0.0266) (0.0257)
LC dummy -0.281 -0.204 1.836∗∗ 1.176 -1.084∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗ 0.312 0.318∗
(0.208) (0.200) (0.930) (0.770) (0.316) (0.306) (0.198) (0.191)
log mean expenditure own caste 0.0987 0.110∗ -0.818∗∗∗ -0.283 -0.381∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗ 0.00172 -0.0715
(0.0747) (0.0623) (0.286) (0.205) (0.0942) (0.0754) (0.0606) (0.0490)
log regional expenditure -0.340∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.303 -0.386∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.0671) (0.0639) (0.255) (0.203) (0.0948) (0.0899) (0.0608) (0.0595)
Observations 43798 43798 17342 17342 41896 41896 43459 43459
Adjusted R2 0.612 0.643 -0.056 0.237 0.523 0.568 0.662 0.682
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spatial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Price Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes. The table reports estimations of equation (2) on our sub-categories of visible and food expenditures. The regression is performed on the subsample of
Middle Caste (MC) and Low Caste (LC). Visible and food consumption are regressed on the log of mean regional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of the
corresponding High Caste (interacted with a caste dummy for MC) and on the log of mean regional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of household’s own
caste. In addition to state ﬁxed effects, we control for the economic level of the NSS region by introducing the log of mean MPCE in each regression. All regressions
include household controls (log of hh size, fraction of people by age and gender, household type, education and occupation head. We also add a ﬁxed effect for
each of the four sub-rounds) and spatial controls (population and urbanization at district levels, sector). Local price indexes are added in speciﬁcation (2) and (4).
Sampling weights are included. Robust standard errors (clustered at the village level) are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Accounting for relative income of HC in speciﬁcation (1)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
visible visible food food
[1em] log total expenditure 0.982∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0177) (0.0177)
Low Castes 0.272∗∗ -0.0319 -0.731∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.196) (0.0757) (0.107)
Middle Castes 0.208∗ 0.119 -0.407∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.174) (0.0714) (0.0970)
Muslims 0.0194 -0.167 -0.486∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.223) (0.0801) (0.113)
Low Castes x log total expenditure -0.0337∗∗ -0.0401∗∗ 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.0885∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0163) (0.00903) (0.00921)
Middle Castes x log total expenditure -0.0254∗ -0.0284∗ 0.0471∗∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0149) (0.00842) (0.00857)
Muslims x log total expenditure -0.00211 -0.00762 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0196) (0.00949) (0.00987)
Low Castes x log mean expenditure HC 0.0476∗∗ -0.0206∗
(0.0236) (0.0121)
Middle Castes x log mean expenditure HC 0.0152 -0.0209∗
(0.0202) (0.0108)
Muslims x log mean expenditure HC 0.0309 0.00166
(0.0257) (0.0137)
Observations 90482 90482 90482 90482
Adjusted R2 0.771 0.771 0.885 0.885
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supply Side Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Caste Inequality No Yes No Yes
Notes. The table reports the OLS estimations of equation (1) on our measure of visible consumption and
food expenditures. The regression is performed on the entire sample. It reports the gap in expenditures of
LC, MC and Muslim households compared to HC households. Visible and food consumption are regressed
on the log of total expenditure of each household, interacted with a caste dummy. Speciﬁcations (1) and
(3) controls for household total expenditure, state ﬁxed effects, household controls (log of hh size, fraction
of people by age and gender, household type, education and occupation head), ﬁxed effect for each of the
four sub-rounds along with supply side controls (mean regional consumption, population and urbanization
at district levels, sector, local price indexes). Speciﬁcation (2) and (4) adds the interaction between the
regional relative consumption of High Caste households and the caste dummies. Sampling weights are
included. Robust standard errors (clustered at the village level) are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
22
LIEPP Working Paper No 56
4.3 Robustness Checks
4.3.1 Outside the Caste Hierarchy: Muslims and Scheduled Tribes
The relative economic status of the high caste may systematically affect poorer households re-
gardless of caste membership. We therefore run the same regressions on groups that do not
belong to the caste system. The Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Muslims were historically disad-
vantaged groups in India, just like the low caste (Scheduled Castes). They are, however, not
considered part of the Hindu caste system, and should not be affected by the process of San-
skritization described by Srinivas.
Table 7: Effect of HC and own caste on Muslims and ST, visible and food expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lvisible lvisible lfood lfood
log total expenditure 1.568∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.155) (0.0994) (0.0718)
log mean expenditure HC 0.147∗∗ 0.0719 -0.0110 -0.00507
(0.0685) (0.0581) (0.0285) (0.0277)
log mean expenditure HC x ST -0.0946∗ -0.0798 -0.0463∗∗ -0.0386∗
(0.0540) (0.0487) (0.0228) (0.0224)
Muslim -0.743∗ -0.598∗ -0.298∗ -0.240
(0.401) (0.360) (0.169) (0.165)
log mean expenditure own caste -0.227∗∗ -0.101 -0.0828 -0.0701∗
(0.111) (0.0718) (0.0508) (0.0384)
log regional expenditure -0.189∗∗∗ -0.0684 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗
(0.0728) (0.0623) (0.0306) (0.0299)
Observations 17336 17336 17336 17336
Adjusted R2 0.690 0.760 0.905 0.909
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Price Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes. The table reports estimations of equation (2) on our measure of visible consump-
tion and food expenditures. The regression is performed on the subsample of Muslims and
Scheduled Tribes (ST). Visible and food consumption are regressed on the log of mean re-
gional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of the corresponding High Caste (interacted
with a caste dummy for MC) and on the log of mean regional monthly per capita expenditure
(MPCE) of household’s own caste. In addition to state ﬁxed effects, we control for the eco-
nomic level of the NSS region by introducing the log of mean MPCE in each regression. All
regressions include household controls (log of hh size, fraction of people by age and gender,
household type, education and occupation head. We also add a ﬁxed effect for each of the
four sub-rounds) and spatial controls (population and urbanization at district levels, sector).
Local price indexes are added in speciﬁcation (2) and (4). Sampling weights are included.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the village level) are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We therefore regress the mean regional per capita expenditures of the upper castes on the
visible and food expenditures of Muslims and Scheduled Tribes (Equation (2)). The results in
columns (1) to (4) of table 7 conﬁrm that ST and Muslim consumption choices are not affected
by the effect of upper castes’ wealth level when it comes to food and conspicuous consumption.
There is also evidence of a general equilibrium effect on prices, which distorts consumption
choices of Muslims and Scheduled Tribes households. However, once we control for prices, we
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ﬁnd no evidence of status preferences driven by the relative consumption of the high caste.
4.3.2 The Reference Group: Caste versus Class
Our measure of relative economic status of high caste households could actually capture income
inequality in a given region. In other words, we would capture an effect that has to do with the
highest economic classes rather than the high castes as the reference group. This hypothesis is
already undermined by our empirical strategy, as we compare similar households of different
castes controlling for economic and demographic characteristics. Indeed, there exist both rich
and poor households within each caste, as can be seen in ﬁgures 1.
Table 8: Caste versus Class: effect of richest 25% households on LC and MC households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lvisible lvisible lfood lfood
log total expenditures 1.116∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗
(0.0929) (0.0816) (0.0444) (0.0392)
log mean expenditures richest 25% 0.176∗ 0.0607 -0.0448 -0.0687∗
(0.0964) (0.0770) (0.0440) (0.0353)
log mean expenditures richest 25% x MC -0.0996∗∗ -0.0691∗ -0.0363∗ -0.0338∗
(0.0414) (0.0395) (0.0199) (0.0193)
LC dummy -0.725∗∗ -0.503∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.270∗
(0.308) (0.293) (0.148) (0.143)
log mean expenditures own group 0.0773 0.103∗∗ -0.0316 -0.0314
(0.0518) (0.0468) (0.0243) (0.0224)
log regional expenditures -0.231∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗ 0.0891∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.0805) (0.0667) (0.0395) (0.0338)
Observations 43879 43879 43878 43878
Adjusted R2 0.715 0.740 0.869 0.874
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spatial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Price Controls Yes No Yes No
Notes. The table reports estimations of equation (2) on our measure of visible consumption and food
expenditures. The regression is performed on the subsample of Middle Caste (MC) and Low Caste
(LC). Visible and food consumption are regressed on the log of mean regional monthly per capita
expenditure (MPCE) of the corresponding richest 25% households (interacted with a caste dummy
for MC) and on the log of mean regional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of household’s
own caste. In addition to state ﬁxed effects, we control for the economic level of the NSS region by
introducing the log of mean MPCE in each regression. All regressions include household controls
(log of hh size, fraction of people by age and gender, household type, education and occupation
head. We also add a ﬁxed effect for each of the four sub-rounds) and spatial controls (population
and urbanization at district levels, sector). Local price indexes are added in speciﬁcation (2) and (4).
Sampling weights are included. Robust standard errors (clustered at the village level) are reported
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To address this concern more speciﬁcally, we compute the mean expenditure of the richest
25% households in each region and run the same regressions as in speciﬁcation (2). We choose
the fourth quartile because it represents a similar share of the population as the high caste
households. Indeed, the later accounts for 24% of the population in our sample. Results are
shown in table 8. We ﬁnd no evidence that our results are explained by a relative income effect
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disconnected from caste membership.
4.3.3 Caste and Discrimination
Lastly, there remains the concern that our results could be driven by discrimination effects. It
could be that in regions where high caste households are richer, low caste households suffer
more from price discrimination or are not allowed to have access to certain categories of expen-
diture. These households would mechanically compensate lower spendings on such categories
of expenditure by consuming more on other items. We therefore run the same regression as in
Section 4.2 on other categories of expenditures, namely health and education, services and the
least visible goods listed in table 10 (Appendix). Results are shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Effect of HC and own caste on LC and MC, other expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lhealth educ lhealth educ lservice lservice lother lother
log total expenditure 1.360∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 1.568∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.243) (0.215) (0.186) (0.0882) (0.0783)
log mean expenditure HC -0.0610 -0.0147 0.0463 0.119 0.0470 0.0465
(0.114) (0.103) (0.0876) (0.0790) (0.0371) (0.0356)
log mean expenditure HC x MC dummy -0.0289 -0.0604 0.0685 0.0383 -0.0192 -0.0140
(0.0692) (0.0660) (0.0514) (0.0482) (0.0222) (0.0217)
LC dummy -0.164 -0.423 0.552 0.306 -0.145 -0.113
(0.516) (0.491) (0.386) (0.361) (0.166) (0.162)
log mean expenditure own caste 0.251 0.0521 0.298∗∗ 0.126 0.0104 -0.0353
(0.162) (0.129) (0.121) (0.0923) (0.0500) (0.0412)
log regional expenditure -0.400∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.114∗∗
(0.151) (0.139) (0.115) (0.105) (0.0483) (0.0476)
Observations 39503 39503 43122 43122 43878 43878
Adjusted R2 0.431 0.472 0.637 0.673 0.624 0.632
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spatial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Price Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes. The table reports estimations of equation (2) on measures of healh and education, services and other goods. The regression is
performed on the subsample of Middle Caste (MC) and Low Caste (LC). Visible and food consumption are regressed on the log of mean
regional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of the corresponding High Caste (interacted with a caste dummy for MC) and on the
log of mean regional monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of household’s own caste. In addition to state ﬁxed effects, we control
for the economic level of the NSS region by introducing the log of mean MPCE in each regression. All regressions include household
controls (log of hh size, fraction of people by age and gender, household type, education and occupation head. We also add a ﬁxed
effect for each of the four sub-rounds) and spatial controls (population and urbanization at district levels, sector). Local price indexes
are added in speciﬁcation (2), (4) and (6). Sampling weights are included. Robust standard errors (clustered at the village level) are
reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
It is striking to see that the relative consumption of high castes households on the low castes
households’ consumption is not signiﬁcant for these other categories of expenditures. Health or
education expenditures, which would be good candidates for discrimination effects increasing
with the relative income of the high caste, are not signiﬁcant. This does not mean that dis-
crimination does not play a role in India, but that we do not ﬁnd evidence that such effects are
correlated with local between-caste inequality and could drive our ﬁndings.
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5 Conclusion
This article documents a gap in conspicuous consumption between caste groups, with low caste
households consuming more conspicuously than high caste households at similar levels of in-
come. This gap in caste-speciﬁc consumption choices is especially large for the poorer house-
holds, and increases with local between-caste inequality. We also underline a pattern of sub-
stitution between conspicuous consumption and food expenditure. This could lead to a status
trap in which the feeling of relative deprivation crowds out high return investments for the fu-
ture self or dynasty such as appropriate nutrition. A back-of-the-envelope calculation leads to a
non-trivial substitution effect: in regions where high castes are twice richer, households living
under 2 dollars a day would spend 15 cents more on conspicuous items and less on food.
These results raise a number of questions needed to be adressed in subsequent research
works. First, there are some limitations to the NSS data: the absence of income data particular
to developing countries makes it harder to ﬁnd a good instrument for consumption, and the sur-
veys only provide a broad categorization of status groups (three caste categories). These issues
probably lower the signiﬁcance of the effect, and the potential identiﬁcation of the reference
group. Replicating these results in other countries with different status groups or at different
stages of development may shed light on the speciﬁcity and magnitude of the Veblen effect
as well as the substitution pattern across consumption categories. Furthermore, these ﬁrst em-
pirical results need to be integrated in a systematic framework linking economic inequality to
status-based inequality in order to infer from these effects a prediction on social welfare and
long-term income distribution. Finally, the potential non-monotonicity of the effect should be
studied depending on local factors that affect social interactions. Indeed, the mechanism be-
hind the feeling of relative deprivation remains unknown: is there a visibility component which
dominates the results, for example if low caste households interact more with the high castes
than other social groups? Does the effect disappear if social groups identify themselves as sufﬁ-
ciently far or foreign to the high caste? Which forms does the feeling of relative deprivation take
depending on local, historical and cultural factors for each social group? These are interesting
avenues for future research, both in theoretical and empirical works, and would clarify how we
should think of status and inequality in the context of development and integration policies.
These preliminary results suggest that it is crucial to take into account a group-level analysis
of inequality when deriving development or redistributive policies. Indeed, the self-reinforcement
effect of status concern within a hierarchical society may not be solved by pure redistribution
if we do not consider inherited group membership. Instead, there may be a need of considering
group-targeted policies so as to directly affect the Veblen externality imposed on disadvantaged
groups. It already takes shape in the awareness of the persistence of caste or race inequality,
and the support for afﬁrmative action policies.
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6 Appendix
6.1 IV speciﬁcation on total expenditures
There is no perfect instrument for total consumption in the absence of income data. Especially if
one wants to look at sub-categories of expenditures. Results presented above do not instrument
total consumption. The use of such a strategy is commented below. All our results presented in
the paper hold when we instrument for income.
Lower-caste households may be more credit-constrained than higher-caste households, which
makes them relatively more sensitive to transitory income shocks. For more conspicuous goods
which are also more durable, there may be a stronger downward bias (Deaton, 1997). On the
contrary, in the case of food and calorie consumption, Bouis and Haddad (1992) have shown
the upward bias dominates. A more speciﬁc issue has to do with the under-representation of
the rich in the NSS consumption data, partly because the rich tend to save more than the poor
(Bardhan, 2008). Upper Castes households being on average richer than lower castes, control-
ling for total consumption may still bias downard the gap in visible consumption between the
upper caste and the lower castes households.
The instruments should be highly correlated with the measure of total expenditures and
uncorrelated with the error term, which includes measurement errors and transitory income.
Being constant over time, education has long been used in the literature (Modigliani and Ando,
1960), as it will have little correlation with transitory income. In the case of India, Behrman
and Deolalikar (1987b) proposes a larger list of instrumental variables5. They also use the
instrumental method as a way to purge the estimated income/food expenditure elasticity of
potential simultaneous equations bias.
Our own preferred instrumental speciﬁcation of household’s total expenditures per capita
follows Charles et al. (2009) and includes the level of education of the head of household and
his detailed occupation code, along with the size of land owned, as land has been argued to
be a good proxy for income in India (Bardhan et al., 2014)6. The use of a logarithmic versus
quadratic form for the estimation of the income elasticity of consumption may depend on which
category of expenditures is considered. Subramanian and Deaton (1996) show that using a log-
arithmic transformation of total expenditures leads to coherent estimates for food and calorie
consumption, but other categories of consumption may require quadratic terms in the logarithm
of expenditure (Banks et al., 1997). Since the inclusion of a quadratic term does not affect
signiﬁcantly the estimates of the expenditure gap between castes we keep the instrumented log-
5The variables used are farm size, percentage of farm area under deep soil, family size, proportions of the
household that are adult males and females, age and schooling years of the household head, total annual rainfall in
the village of residence, and various village and year dummies.
6The instrumental speciﬁcation is robust to the inclusion of additional variables such as the proportions of the
household that are adult males and females, age of the household head or the number of children.
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arithmic transformation as our main speciﬁcation of permanent income7. Finally, an estimation
based on the Lesser-Working form of Engel curve, i.e. where we replace the log of total ex-
penditures for a given category of consumption by its budget share does not alter the results.
The instrumental regression conﬁrms the standard predictions of a downward bias for visible
expenditures as the permanent income elasticity goes from an average 1.1 with the OLS speciﬁ-
cation of permanent income to 1.4 when we instrument for total expenditures. On the contrary,
food (and calorie) consumption are biased upward, with permanent income elasticities for food
going from 0.7 to 0.6, which in Bouis and Haddad (1992) and Subramanian and Deaton (1996).
6.2 Additional ﬁgures
Table 10: Items visibility in India (source: Khamis et al. 2012)
7As in Subramanian and Deaton (1996), non-linearity complicates the issue of estimation bias, which is another
reason why we favour the log linear structure.
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(a) Toileteries (perfume, soap or body cream) (b) Animal Products (meat, ﬁsh, eggs or dairy)
Figure 5: HC regional expenditures shares vs. HC regional income (mean regional income
control)
(a) Toileteries (perfume, body cream, soap) (b) Animal Products (meat, ﬁsh, eggs, dairy)
Figure 6: Muslims regional expenditures shares vs. HC regional income (mean regional income
control)
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